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MIRACLES AND THE SHROUD OF TURIN 
Stephen Griffith 
Using the scientific investigation of the Shroud of Turin as an extended exam-
ple, it is argued that miracles are best understood not as violations of natural 
law, but as scientifically inexplicable events. It is then argued that even 
though we can imagine circumstances in which science itself might provide 
us with good grounds for believing that an event is scientifically inexplicable, 
these grounds would at best provide us with circumstantial evidence that the 
event was miraculous, and would in any case be inconclusive. 
For several centuries, philosophical discourse concerning miracles has 
largely consisted of trying to determine whether the concept of a miracle 
could be defined in such a way that miracles could be 0) logically possi-
ble, (2) consistent with the predominant secular (scientific) worldview, 
and (3) known to occur. Putting it this way puts the very idea of the 
miraculous on the defensive, since we presuppose the secular world view 
and then ask whether this worldview leaves any room for miracles. I 
suggest that we consider the possibility of presupposing a theistic 
worldview which includes at least the possibility of miracles and then 
ask what implications this has for science. For the purpose of this paper, 
I shall simply assume that such a theistic worldview can be shown to be 
inherently rational, and that there are no sound a priori arguments 
against the possibility of miracles. After sketching roughly what a theis-
tic account of miracles might look like, I shall discuss whether scientific 
investigation can provide us with evidence for or against the occurrence 
of miracles, using the image on the infamous Shroud of Turin as an 
extended example. 
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to attempt to describe or 
defend a theistic world view to any great extent. For our present purpos-
es it will suffice to note that according to any standard interpretation of 
the theistic world view, God is both the creator and sustainer of the 
physical universe. If we then suppose that there are "ultimate con-
stituents" of the universe, i.e., entities of which it is ultimately com-
posed, whether they be atoms, intelligences, monads, leptons, or 
"strings", it follows that God is the creator and sustainer of these con-
stituents. If we further suppose that these entities, which I shall hence-
forth refer to as "theons", have certain inherent properties, some of 
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which are causal powers which determine how these theons interact, it 
seems reasonable to suppose that God must continually supply theons 
with whatever properties they have. 1 In other words, at any given 
moment, the physical world consists of entities which are at that 
moment being sustained by God, and these entities have properties 
which are at that moment being supplied by God. 
Since we observe regularities in the physical world, regularities which 
have been discovered and described in increasingly precise mathemati-
cal detail by modern science, it follows as a matter of empirical fact that 
if the world does in fact consist of theons, both the existence and the 
nature of most theons must be fairly stable. Within the context of the 
theistic model of creation sketched above, what this amounts to is that, 
for the most part, God continuously sustains the same set of theons and 
continuously supplies them with the same sets of properties. From this 
theistic point of view, it is only because God acts in this way that science 
as we know it is even possible. If God frequently and randomly created 
new theons or failed to sustain existing ones, or changed their inherent 
properties, it is difficult to see how human beings could even function or 
survive, much less engage in the process of formulating and testing gen-
eral hypotheses concerning the nature of the physical universe, activities 
which are central to and at least partly definitive of the modern scientific 
enterprise. The existence of the above-mentioned regularities, often 
referred to as the laws of nature, is thus not only consistent with, but can 
also be explained in terms of, a theistic world view, in that it can simply 
be regarded as resulting from the continuous typical action of God in 
creating and sustaining the universe. Why, then, should there be any 
tension between theism and the scientific worldview concerning the 
possibility of miracles? 
The source of tension here is twofold. In the first place, philosophers 
have persisted in thinking of the laws of nature as absolutely exception-
less universal generalizations. In the second place, despite the lack of 
any scriptural or theological justification for doing so, philosophers have 
persisted in thinking of miracles as "violations" of the laws of nature, 
where the term "violation" is understood in such a way as to make it 
logically impossible for miracles to occur in a world entirely governed 
by such laws. Thinking of the laws of nature and of miracles in these 
ways has in turn made it seem to many philosophers that if there are 
true laws of nature, there must be no miracles, and vice-versa. 
As the scientific enterprise and our understanding of it evolve, how-
ever, it becomes increasingly unclear whether there really are any 
Humean laws of nature, or if there are, whether they can play the central 
role they were once thought to play in our understanding of the physical 
world.' It thus becomes correspondingly clear that it is at best inappro-
priate if not perverse to continue to define miracles as violations of nat-
ural law in this sense. To the extent that we understand scientific laws 
in the non-Humean way that scientists themselves typically do, we can 
readily imagine the occurrence of physical events which are "violations" 
of such laws, which clearly leaves open the possibility of miracles, even 
if we restrict our attention to those miracles which are exceptions to the 
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commonly perceived regularities in nature.; 
But even if we remove the particular source of tension mentioned 
above, it does not follow that there is no tension between scientific and 
theistic worldviews concerning the possibility of miracles. On the con-
trary, this tension reappears in the form of a question as to whether 
there are (or could be) scientifically inexplicable events. Those commit-
ted to a scientific worldview are wont to think that all events in the 
physical world must be scientifically explicable, at least in principle, 
whereas at least some of those who subscribe to a theistic world view are 
wont to think that at least some purported miracles are miraculous at 
least partly because they are scientifically inexplicable. 
The nature and significance of scientific explanation is philosophical-
ly problematic, and it would be beyond the scope of this paper to dis-
cuss it in any detail. It is noteworthy, however, that most theories of sci-
entific explanation incorporate in one way or another the idea that indi-
vidual events in the physical world are to be explained by subsuming 
their descriptions under general laws, whether these laws are determin-
istic or indeterministic, statistical or non-statistical. Within the context 
of the version of theism sketched above, however, these general laws are 
to be explained entirely in terms of the fact that God seldom creates, fails 
to sustain, or changes the causal powers of His theons. Thus, to explain 
an event scientifically is in effect simply to show that it is ultimately the 
result of God's typical behavior as creator and sustainer of the universe. 
There is no reason, scientific or otherwise, to believe that God always 
behaves in this statistically typical manner, much less that He must do 
so. Miracles, within this framework, can be understood simply as events 
which occur when and because God, sometime after the First Instant, if 
there was one, creates, fails to sustain, or changes the inherent properties 
of one or more theons, which He might do in answer to a prayer, to pro-
vide the faithful with a sign, or for various other reasons. To say that 
miracles are impossible, within this context, would be to say that God 
(after the First Instant, if there was one) can neither create new theons, 
refrain from sustaining existing ones, nor change their inherent proper-
ties, but what reason could anyone have for saying any of these things? 
Neither science nor common sense tell us that these things cannot hap-
pen. The most they can tell us is that we have no reason to believe that 
they happen frequently, but this is not only consistent with theism, but 
also tends to support it to the extent that a high degree of orderliness in 
the universe has often been thought to suggest divine creation. 
Moreover, there does not seem to be any theological or scriptural reason 
for objecting to the account sketched above. 
Assuming that we are willing to take the above account of miracles 
seriously, it would be difficult if not impossible to show that miracles 
were impossible, but could we ever have good reason to believe that a 
miracle had occurred? It follows from the account of miracles suggested 
above that miracles, if they occur, will not necessarily be subsumable 
under natural law', since, by hypothesis, natural laws are simply regu-
larities based on the typical continuous action of God in the world, and 
miracles are, by hypothesis, exceptions to this continuous action. Thus, 
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to the extent that scientific explanation depends upon our ability to sub-
sume events under these natural laws, it follows that miracles will typi-
cally be scientifically inexplicable. If, then, we have good reason to 
believe that some particular event is scientifically inexplicable in the rel-
evant sense, we also have at least some reason to believe that the event 
in question is miraculous, but there are several important qualifications 
which must be made at this point. 
To say that something is "scientifically inexplicable" is presumably to 
say simply that it cannot be explained by science, but there are several 
different senses in which science might be incapable of explaining some-
thing. There is a fairly weak sense in which a wide variety of physical 
phenomena are scientifically inexplicable. In some cases, we lack suffi-
cient data or, at the opposite extreme, our data is so extensive that it is 
technologically unmanageable. No scientist, for example, could predict 
the exact path taken by a feather dropped from the top of a tall building 
on a breezy day, nor could the same scientist explain this path in detail 
after the fact. In other cases, we are unable to offer a definitive scientific 
explanation of a phenomenon simply because there are too many possi-
ble explanations for it, each of which is consistent both with all of the 
available data and with currently accepted scientific theory. There are 
so many technologically feasible methods of glazing pottery, for exam-
ple, that it is often technologically impossible to determine which 
method was used on some particular sample of ancient pottery. At the 
same time, no one regards either the path taken by the feather or the 
glazing as scientifically inexplicable in any meaningful sense. The reason 
for this is that in both cases we are confident that the phenomena in 
question are in principle scientifically explicable, even if they are not so in 
fact. In the case of the feather, we are confident that its downward path 
can in principle be explained in terms of the shape and weight of the 
feather, the motions of the air surrounding the feather, and the various 
laws of motion applicable in this case. In the case of the glazing, we are 
confident that if we had more data, such as how many times the pottery 
was heated and to what temperature, and in what order, we would be 
able to choose the correct explanation from our list of possibilities. In 
both of these cases, and in all cases in which phenomena are scientifical-
ly inexplicable in the weak sense currently under consideration, our con-
fidence that these phenomena are scientifically explicable in principle is 
based on the fact that they give us no reason to believe that we must add 
to or change any of our currently accepted scientific principles in order 
to explain them. 
Let us suppose, however, that we encounter certain phenomena that 
are not so easily dealt with. Suppose, in particular, that we have collected 
data that would ordinarily be regarded as more than sufficient to explain 
some particular phenomenon within the context of currently accepted 
scientific theory, but are nevertheless unable to explain it. Suppose that 
we have no reason to believe that additional data would be helpful. 
Better yet, suppose that the data which we already have seems to rule out 
any conceivable explanation of the phenomenon in question in terms of 
currently accepted scientific theory. It will simply not do to say that phe-
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nomena of this sort cannot or do not occur. Scientists can and do deal 
with such phenomena, and would make no progress without doing so, 
since it is precisely phenomena of this sort, when authenticated and 
repeatable, which force scientists to re-examine and revise their theories.5 
Once the theories are revised, of course, the phenomena in question are 
no longer inexplicable, which is precisely the point of the revisions. But 
what if a particular phenomenon is thoroughly authenticated but not 
repeatable? Suppose, for example, that a man calling himself Jesus began 
to walk on water, and we could scientifically authenticate that He was in 
fact doing so? Would we then revise our scientific theories to accommo-
date this event, or would we simply regard this event as scientifically 
inexplicable? It would seem that any phenomenon fitting this descrip-
tion would be scientifically inexplicable in a much stronger sense than 
that described above. It would also fit the theistic definition of miracles 
sketched above, because the very fact that it was scientifically inexplica-
ble strongly suggests that at least some of the theons participating in the 
event in question have causal powers other than those they normally 
have. It would thus appear that in a case like that described above, sci-
ence might not only be consistent with theism, but actually provide evi-
dence that a miraculous event had occurred. It could, for example, pro-
vide quite ordinary and acceptable scientific evidence that the substance 
being walked upon is ordinary water (assuming that God has not 
changed the theons which compose the water), and that the man called 
Jesus has a body like other human bodies with respect to those properties 
which normally determine buoyancy, but which, inexplicably, does not 
sink in this particular case. We do not, of course, have any evidence of 
this sort for this particular miracle, and some would claim that there are 
in fact no examples of such an event. It is easy, however, to imagine such 
a case, and I will now attempt to illustrate this fact by means of an 
extended discussion of the Shroud of Turin. 
The Shroud of Turin is a sizable piece of linen cloth which bears the 
image of a recently crucified man. It is known to have been in existence 
since at least 1354 A.D. and is believed by some to be the actual burial 
shroud of Jesus of Nazareth. Because Jesus died more than nineteen 
centuries ago, public interest in the Shroud waned significantly when it 
was announced that carbon-14 dating tests conducted by three suppos-
edly reliable laboratories had indicated that the Shroud was only a little 
more than six centuries old. Prior to the carbon dating tests, however, 
scientists had subjected the Shroud to numerous non-destructive tests 
and measurements in an effort to determine both the nature and the ori-
gin of the image which it bears. For most of these scientists, and for oth-
ers who understand the implications of their work, the results of the car-
bon dating tests simply deepen the mystery of the image on the Shroud. 
Marvin Mueller is a research physicist at the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory. He is familiar with many of the visual characteristics of the 
image on the Shroud, but unfamiliar with the results of many of the sci-
entific tests performed on it. Even before the carbon dating tests were 
done, Mueller was convinced that the Shroud was a medieval work of 
art. In a published paper, he says the following: 
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"There are only three classes of possibilities for the image for-
mation: by human artifice, through natural processes transfer-
ring the image to the linen from a real crucified corpse, or by 
supernatural means."6 
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As a scientist, he immediately rejects the possibility that the image was 
produced by supernatural means, because he believes that if we take 
this possibility seriously, "all scientific discussion and all rational dis-
course must perforce cease".7 He then goes on to say that, based on the 
visible characteristics of the image itself, "natural processes ... can be 
ruled out definitively [his italics]. .. ", presumably on theoretical grounds 
of an extremely general kind.s Tn other words, he argues for the first leg 
of his trichotomy, i.e., for the claim that the Shroud is a work of art, pri-
marily by rejecting the other two. The problem is that the STURP scien-
tists·, who have worked most closely with the Shroud, are almost unani-
mous in rejecting any possibility of human artifice, simply because the 
best interpretations of the substantial data which they have collected 
count strongly against this possibility. 
Let us now suppose that the trichotomy suggested by Mueller is legit-
imate, as it certainly seems to be. Let us further suppose that Mueller can 
justify, on scientific grounds, his rejection of the possibility that the 
image on the Shroud was produced naturally without human artifice. 
Finally, let us suppose that the STURP scientists can justify, again on sci-
entific grounds, their rejection of the possibility that the image was pro-
duced by human artifice. In other words, let us suppose that we have 
strong scientific grounds for rejecting both the possibility that the image 
is the result of human artifice and the possibility that it is the result of 
natural processes not involving human artifice. Would we then be justi-
fied in regarding the Shroud image as "scientifically inexplicable", and 
would we then have strong scientific grounds for accepting the third leg 
of Mueller's trichotomy and believing that the image was produced by 
supernatural means? 
Let us begin by examining Mueller's trichotomy more carefully. 
Although Mueller talks as if he is referring simply to different sorts of 
processes (of image formation), it is clear from the context that he is 
thinking primarily of explanations. But this presupposes that there are 
objective facts here which need to be explained. Is this really true? 
With regard to the image on the Shroud, it is clear that it is not a pure-
ly subjective phenomenon like the visions of Mary and Jesus often 
reported by believers. Although faint, it is nonetheless visible to the 
naked eye for normally sighted human beings and can be photographed 
using any standard (and many non-standard) photographic techniques. 
It is, in short, a completely objective feature of the cloth. Moreover, 
although it is logically possible that the image is just an "accidental" fea-
ture of the cloth in the same way that outcroppings of rock sometimes 
look like human faces in profile, this possibility does not deserve serious 
consideration in the case of the Shroud. The image, when examined 
closely, is simply too anatomically accurate and too detailed to be 
"explained away" in this manner. It would thus appear that the exis-
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tence of the image on the Shroud of Turin is an objective fact which, like 
any other physical phenomenon which cannot be regarded as due sim-
ply to chance, must have an explanation. 
We must now ask whether Mueller's trichotomy exhausts all possibil-
ities of explanation. Given the common understanding of the term 
"supernatural", it is clear that all possible explanations must be either 
supernatural or naturalistic.lO Ignoring the possibility of a supernatural 
explanation for the moment, it would seem that any naturalistic expla-
nation must explain the nature and origin of the image completely in 
terms of such things as the substance(s) of which it is now composed 
and the various purely physical events involving the Shroud which have 
occurred throughout its natural history. Assuming, as we surely must, 
that the cloth itself antedates the image, there are only two possibilities 
concerning the composition of the image itself. One possibility is that it 
consists of a colored substance which has adhered to the cloth in just 
those places necessary to account for the image which we see. The other 
possibility is that some physical process has transformed certain fibers 
of the cloth itself in such a way as to discolor them, thus producing the 
image. To explain the image is thus, in the former case, to explain how 
the colored substance got onto the Shroud, and in the latter case, to 
explain how the fibers were transformed. If a human artist initiated 
either of these processes in order to produce the image, the Shroud is a 
work of art, and otherwise not. But since we are justified in assuming 
that the image is an objective and non-accidental feature of the Shroud, 
the only conceivable hypothesis concerning image-formation in the 
absence of human artifice would surely be one involving interaction 
between the Shroud and a human body. Thus all naturalistic explana-
tions are either explanations in terms of human artifice or explanations 
involving such interaction, and Mueller's trichotomy is established. 
Initially, it seems overwhelmingly probable that the Shroud is a work 
of art. After all, there is a clear sense in which the image on the Shroud is 
a two-dimensional image of a three-dimensional entity, and there are 
extraordinarily few examples of such things which are not due to artistic 
endeavor of some sort.ll Jesus has probably been artistically depicted 
more often and in a greater variety of ways than any other figure in 
Western civilization, and the fact that various bodily features, such as 
wounds, correspond to the events described in the Biblical narrative can 
readily be explained in terms of the intentions of an informed artist. 
Besides, no other naturalistic explanation for something like the image 
springs readily to mind. 
This helps to explain why most people, like Mueller, are so quick to 
assume that the Shroud is a work of art. It also explains why the STURP 
team began by attempting to confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis, 
rather than the naturalistic hypothesis rejected by Mueller. In particular, 
they initially assumed that the image on the Shroud was a painting and 
attempted, by means of various tests and measurements, to determine 
how it was painted and with what. As previously mentioned, this 
hypothesis initially seemed by far the most probable, but the epistemic 
probability of a given hypothesis being true depends on what else we 
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know or have good reason to believe. As it turns out in the case of the 
Shroud, most of the available scientific data concerning the image on the 
Shroud of Turin tend to disconfirm the hypothesis that it is a work of 
art, and nearly all of the STURP scientists have essentially ruled out this 
hypothesis. They do not claim to have proven that the Shroud is not a 
work of art. Their claim is rather that this hypothesis has been shown to 
be highly improbable." 
How can an hypothesis which is prima facie the most probable become 
highly improbable? It would be beyond the scope of this paper to 
attempt to cover all of the details of the scientific investigation which 
leads to this conclusion, but some of the more accessible details can be 
readily given. In the first place, the clearly visible details of the image 
itself raise suspicions as to why an artist would have created it with the 
features that it has. It consists, for example, of both a dorsal and a ven-
tral image arranged longwise on the cloth and placed head to head, a 
most peculiar artistic rendering of a human figure. In the second place, 
the image has all the shading and contrast of a "negative" image, as if 
the Shroud were a photographic negative waiting to be developed, and 
we know that the image was in existence many centuries before the 
invention of photography. Why would a medieval or classical artist cre-
ate a "photographically negative" image? 
The results of the scientific tests, however, are by far the most telling 
evidence against the hypothesis that the Shroud is a work of art. Various 
tests, for example, indicate the presence of blood, probably human, on 
the Shroud. More precisely, although there is no single scientific test 
which is definitive for the presence of blood, what appears to be blood on 
the Shroud gives a positive reading on twelve different standard tests for 
blood. This implies that the substance on the Shroud which appears to be 
blood is either blood or a mixture of twelve other substances, each of 
which gives a positive reading for one of the twelve different tests.13 The 
likelihood that these twelve substances would be mixed together deliber-
ately by an artist or occur together naturally in some sort of artistic medi-
um is vanishingly small, so if what appear to be blood stains on the 
Shroud were put there by an artist, the artist must have used real blood. 
Moreover, tests have shown that some of the blood found on the Shroud 
is pre-mortem blood, and some, especially that found on the area of the 
cloth corresponding to the side wound on the image (supposedly from 
the spear wound inflicted by one of the executioners), is post-mortem 
blood.14 In addition, x-ray fluoroscopy indicates the presence of serum 
albumin on the Shroud in those areas of the image where one would 
expect to find it if the ostensible blood stains on the Shroud were in fact 
due to wounds on a human body.15 If the Shroud is simply a work of art, 
the artist must have applied not only both pre-mortem and post-mortem 
blood, but also serum albumin in the appropriate places on the Shroud. 
The application of serum albumin by an artist would be especially 
remarkable, in view of the fact that it is a colorless liquid which remains 
invisible and leaves physical effects visible only under ultraviolet light. 
Finally, it has been determined that the blood on the Shroud was there 
before the image was.16 If both the apparent bloodstains and the image on 
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the Shroud were put there by an artist, he or she must have begun by 
putting blood and serum on the Shroud in various locations with the idea 
of subsequently creating the image - a very unlikely scenario. 
With regard to the image itself, as opposed to the apparent blood-
stains, there are even greater difficulties for the hypothesis that it was 
created by an artist. Microscopic examination reveals that there are no 
brushstrokes, and no capillary action within the fibrils of the cloth 
(which would necessarily have occurred if any liquid medium had been 
used to create the image). Moreover, no pigment or other substance of 
an appropriate kind and of sufficient amount to account for the image 
was detected. This implies not only that the image is not a painting or 
drawing of any kind, but also that it is not a rubbing, since this would 
also require that some sort of colored particles adhere to the cloth. The 
scientific investigation of the image shows that it is extraordinarily 
superficial and consists of nothing but submicroscopic oxidized cellu-
lose fibrils. In other words, the image was produced when some physi-
cal process slightly oxidized certain fibrils. The problem is that there is 
no known physical process sufficiently subject to human control to 
enable an artist to create such an image. The application of a liquid oxi-
dizing agent would show the effects of capillary action, even more than 
most liquid artistic media, and the use of a solid would have left some 
residue and could not have been controlled well enough to produce 
such a precise image. Finally, although various forms of radiant energy 
are capable of oxidizing cloth, none of them can be controlled well 
enough by human beings to produce a precise image like that on the 
ShroudY This seems to exhaust the possibilities of artistic creation, but 
there is still at least one more bit of scientific data indicating that the 
image cannot be a work of art. 
The most intriguing scientific data pertaining to the image on the 
Shroud is that obtained by means of the VP-8 image analyzer. The VP-8 
was developed by NASA to obtain "photographs" of celestial objects in 
outer space. Unlike ordinary cameras, which rely on the diffused light 
available within the earth's atmosphere to create an albedo image, the 
VP-8 must rely entirely on light which emanates or is reflected directly 
in straight lines from the object being photographed. Since the intensity 
of light decreases as it travels through space, the VP-8 is programmed to 
create realistic images of objects by treating their distances from the lens 
of the VP-8 as a function of the intensity of the light reaching it from 
those objects. In other words, if the intensity of the light reaching the 
VP-8 from object A is less than that reaching it from object B, the VP-8 
will create a picture which makes it look like object A is further away 
from the camera than object B. The same principle applies to a single 
three-dimensional object in that the part of that object that seems the far-
thest away in the picture created by the VP-8 will be that part from 
which light of the lowest intensity is detected by the VP-8. 
The VP-8 is fairly effective at producing realistic images of three-
dimensional objects in outer space, but because of the effects of diffu-
sion, it produces remarkably distorted images when its lenses are 
trained on ordinary two-dimensional representations of three-dim en-
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sionalobjects. In other words, a photograph of a realistic painting taken 
by the VP-8 will not normally look realistic, nor will VP-8 photographs 
of ordinary photographs. Photographs taken by the VP-8 of the image 
on the Shroud, however, while they lack the resolution of ordinary pho-
tographs, do look realistic, at least in the sense that there is no spatial 
distortion of the sort to be expected. This may not seem important to a 
typical layperson, but to the physicists investigating the Shroud, it was 
an important fact which needed to be explained. The most intriguing 
fact is that the VP-8 takes into account differences in light intensity that 
are far too small to be detected by human beings with the naked eye. 
Artists who were commissioned to attempt to duplicate the physical 
appearance of the image on the Shroud were unable to produce images 
which did not produce distortion when photographed by the VP-8 even 
though these images were, to the naked eye, almost indistinguishable 
from the Shroud imageY Given the range and accuracy of the VP-S in 
detecting different light intensities, the likelihood that a human artist 
would accidentally create an image which does not produce distortion is 
extremely small. 
These considerations and many others like them have convinced 
nearly all of the STURP scientists that the image on the Shroud cannot 
be a work of art. As previously mentioned, they do not claim to have 
proven that it is not a work of art, but scientists seldom if ever claim to 
have proven anything absolutely. What they do say in this case is that it 
is highly improbable that the Shroud is a work of art, which is to say that 
they regard the hypothesis that it is not as highly confirmed. 
The STURP scientists, of course, as scientists, are still committed to 
the view that there must be a naturalistic explanation for the image, so 
they have turned to the other naturalistic leg of Mueller's trichotomy 
and are attempting to explain the image in terms of some sort of physi-
cal interaction between the cloth and the body of a recently crucified 
man. This sort of explanation, however, is precisely the sort that Mueller 
claims can be "ruled out definitively".19 The problem is that there are 
strong theoretical considerations which seem to count against any 
image-formation hypothesis consistent with both the known facts and 
with currently accepted scientific theory. Explanations in terms of fune-
real oils and bodily secretions can be ruled out due to the previously 
mentioned lack of capillarity displayed by the image, and lack of 
residues rules out powdered oxidizing agents. The clarity of the image 
rules out oxidizing vapors as a source of the image. Given the results of 
the VP-S investigation, the best naturalistic hypothesis is that the image 
was created by some form of radiation emanating from a human body, 
but there is no explanation of how this radiation could have been pro-
duced, nor is there any known form of radiation which would have all 
the requisite image-producing characteristics. One of the STURP scien-
tists sums up the status of the scientific attempt to explain the image in 
the following way: 
"Briefly stated, we seem to know what the image is chemically, 
but how it got there remains a mystery. The dilemma is not one 
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of choosing from among a variety of likely transfer mechanisms, 
but rather that no technologically credible process has been pos-
tulated that satisfies all the characteristics of the existing 
image."2o 
It might be appropriate at this point to reconsider the results of the 
carbon dating tests. If these tests had shown conclusively that the 
Shroud carne into existence only six or seven centuries ago, then we cer-
tainly would have been justified in concluding that it could not have 
been the burial shroud of Jesus. This would also have lent significant 
support to the skeptical view that the Shroud was, after all, nothing but 
a medif''lal work of art. There are several problems with this view. In the 
first place, the carbon-14 dating results are by no means conclusive. The 
methods used are very controversial in archaeological circles, especially 
when applied to cloth, since the method has often produced results 
which are many centuries off when applied to samples of known age. In 
addition, there are special problems in this particular case. The sample 
used was apparently taken from a narrow strip along one side of the 
cloth which might well have been added in the fourteenth century to 
center the image for its first public display. Extreme heat from a fire 
which almost destroyed the Shroud in 1532 could have resulted in ion 
exchange which would have invalidated the results of the carbon dating 
tests, as would various forms of radiation, which is significant if the 
image was produced by a form of radiation. Finally, it has recently been 
reported that the laboratories which conducted the tests may have failed 
to cleanse the Shroud fragments of invisible, submicroscopic fungi, the 
presence of which would also invalidate the results of a carbon-dating 
test. More importantly for our present purposes, however, the results of 
the carbon-dating tests, even if completely accurate, do nothing to explain 
how the image was formed! If the Shroud itself carne into existence in 
the fourteenth century, then the image was produced no earlier than 
that, but how? Every bit of data which indicates that the Shroud is not a 
work of art is completely unaffected by the carbon-14 data, and the 
hypothesis that the image was produced by contact with a crucified 
body becomes less likely than it would otherwise be, since it is less likely 
that anyone was crucified in the fourteenth century. We still have no 
naturalistic explanation of how the image was formed, and the "contact" 
hypotheses currently favored by the STURP scientists are now even less 
plausible than they would otherwise be. This explains why the results of 
the carbon dating tests, far from resolving anything, actually make the 
situation more confusing than ever to knowledgeable sindonologists. 
Let us now summarize our discussion so far. It would seem that if we 
assume that the image on the Shroud of Turin is neither subjective nor 
an accidental phenomenon, then the only naturalistic explanations of its 
nature and existence are that it is a work of art or that it is the natural 
effect of a natural interaction between the cloth and a human body. 
There is a strong body of scientific evidence which counts against the 
hypothesis that it is a work of art, and there are strong theoretical con-
siderations which count against its being the result of a natural interac-
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tion. No one has claimed that either of these hypotheses has been con-
clusively disproven, but it could be argued that they have both been sci-
entifically disconfirmed to such an extent that they have become unrea-
sonable to believe. But what then is reasonable to believe about the 
image? If it really is "scientifically inexplicable", are we to believe sim-
ply that it has no explanation, or should we believe that the correct 
explanation, if we are willing to call it an "explanation", is that a super-
natural event has occurred? Within the context of the theistic frame-
work sketched earlier in this paper, why not simply conclude that God 
changed the inherent properties of some of the theons composing the 
Shroud in order to produce the image? If we decide to reject the results 
of the carbon dating tests, why not simply conclude that the image was 
produced when God changed the causal powers of the theons compos-
ing the body of Jesus at the moment of the Resurrection? 
As of this writing, it is tempting to regard the image on the Shroud of 
Turin as scientifically inexplicable in the stronger of the two senses 
described above. In the first place, far from not having enough data, we 
seem to have enough to know exactly what the image consists in, even 
though we have no idea what produced it. In the second place, far from 
having too many possible explanations to choose from, we currently 
have none consistent both with what we know about the image and with 
currently accepted scientific theory.21 Finally, although we have not 
mentioned this previously, the Shroud image appears to be unique. If 
the Shroud is a burial garment, it is the only one among thousands of 
extant specimens which bears a recognizable image (although there are 
many with decomposition stains and bloodstains on them), and if it is a 
work of art, it is the only one which has many of the physical features 
previously described. It thus appears that it might satisfy all of the con-
ditions mentioned for something's being scientifically inexplicable in the 
strong sense mentioned above. 
The fact that no satisfactory scientific explanation of the Shroud 
image has been given does not imply that none can be, and no scientists, 
including the members of STURP, have concluded that the Shroud 
image is scientifically inexplicable. For one thing, despite everything 
that has been said above, it is nevertheless true that the facts about the 
Shroud of Turin are not all in, and never will be. Besides, it is always 
possible that some of the data referred to earlier will prove to be faulty, 
or that someone will discover a fairly simple naturalistic hypothesis that 
has been overlooked, in which case the Shroud of Turin may lose its air 
of mystery. It is also possible, however, that the data will not prove to 
be faulty, and that the origin of the image will never be naturalistically 
explained. In any case, it would appear, as of this writing at least, that 
science has given us good reason to believe that the image on the Shroud 
of Turin is scientifically inexplicable in a fairly strong sense of the term. 
A fairly intensive scientific investigation has given us no good scientific 
reason to believe that the image is a work of art, and many scientific rea-
sons to believe that it is not. Moreover, despite extensive knowledge of 
the physical nature of this particular image and of the various processes 
which are capable of producing images on cloth, this same scientific 
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investigation has produced no credible hypothesis concerning the forma-
tion of the image. Moreover, scientists have more or less ruled out entire 
classes of potential explanations, and it is difficult to see how more data 
would help. In recent years, each new batch of data has simply deep-
ened the mystery. As the scientific grounds for rejecting both of the first 
two legs of Mueller's trichotomy continue to accumulate, must there not 
be some point at which it is simply unreasonable to believe that the 
image on the Shroud has a completely naturalistic explanation? And 
would it not then become reasonable to infer that it must have a super-
natural explanation? 
The answer to this question at present is at best a "qualified maybe". 
To see why, we must re-examine the argument derived from Mueller's 
trichotomy. Simply put, the argument has the following logical form: 
(1) The Shroud image is either a work of art, a result of a natural 
interaction between a human body and the cloth, or a supernatur-
al phenomenon. 
(2) The Shroud image is not a work of art. 
(3) The Shroud image is not a result of a natural interaction between 
a human body and the cloth. 
Therefore, 
(4) The Shroud image is a supernatural phenomenon. 
This is a valid form of argument, and we have already established that 
(1) is true. If we could establish the truth of (2) and (3) to the same 
degree of credibility as (1), we could then be confident of the truth of (4). 
Assuming that supernatural phenomena are almost always scientifically 
inexplicable, we could then regard the Shroud image as scientifically 
inexplicable in an "absolute" sense of the term. As it turns out, of course, 
we never can establish the truth of (2) and (3) to the same degree of cred-
ibility as (1), but it would at least appear that (2) and (3) might be ren-
dered increasingly probable by further scientific research, in which case 
the probability of (4) would presumably be increased as well. Thus it 
would seem that science itself might indeed present us with good 
grounds for believing that a scientifically inexplicable event has 
occurred. To .put it another way, the scientific evidence which we have 
concerning the image on the Shroud of Turin is of considerable weight, 
and gives us much more reason to believe that the image is scientifically 
inexplicable than we would otherwise have. Moreover, it might even 
turn out that when all is said and done, the most reasonable explanation, 
all things considered, for the image on the Shroud of Turin is that a 
miraculous event has occurred, or perhaps even that the image was pro-
duced by the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. 
Even if, however, science can provide us with good grounds for 
believing that a scientifically inexplicable event has occurred, it does not 
follow that science can prove that this has happened, nor does it follow 
that science in itself can show that such an event must be miraculous. In 
the first place, just as there can be violations of scientific law which are 
not miraculous, there can be scientifically inexplicable events which are 
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not miraculous. Although we might have good grounds for regarding a 
scientifically inexplicable spontaneous remission of an ordinarily fatal 
disease as miraculous, we would presumably not so regard a scientifical-
ly inexplicable recurrence (or first occurrence) of such a disease. The 
point here is that even in those cases where an event's being scientifically 
inexplicable is an important reason for its being regarded as miraculous, 
it is never a sufficient condition for so regarding it. The concept of a mira-
cle must obviously be defined at least partly in terms of divine agency 
and purpose, but the nature of God precludes a direct empirical discov-
ery of either of these things. Thus, even in those cases where a theistic 
explanation seems to be the most reasonable, science itself cannot pro-
vide direct evidence of divine involvement, and any inferences to such 
involvement, even if justified in some sense, is not scientifically justified.22 
More importantly, all claims concerning scientific inexplicability are 
necessarily defeasible, so that what is scientifically inexplicable today 
might not be scientifically inexplicable tomorrow. This is not to say that 
we are never justified in believing that something is scientifically inexplic-
able, nor is it to say that nothing can be permanently or absolutely scientif-
ically inexplicable. It is simply to say that even in those cases in which the 
most reasonable thing to say is that something is scientifically inexplica-
ble, it is nevertheless possible that this might not always be the case. 
Everything science tells us is provisional. This is inherent in the nature of 
science. With regard to the Shroud of Turin, for example, no matter how 
probable (2) and (3) become relative to available evidence and then-cur-
rent scientific theory, it will always be at least possible that either (2) or (3) 
is false, so that (4) can never be conclusively established by means of this 
argument. We will always be free to withhold judgment while we contin-
ue to attempt to discredit either (2) or (3), and this is precisely what the 
STURP scientists have done and will probably continue to do. 
Any attempt to enlist science as the handmaiden of theology in this 
case thus runs into two difficulties. In the first place, it must acknowl-
edge that science can at best provide indirect, circumstantial support for 
the claim that a miracle has occurred. Even if science could somehow 
conclusively demonstrate the truth of both (2) and (3), non-scientific con-
siderations would also have to be introduced to justify the conclusion 
that a miracle had occurred. In the second place, it must acknowledge 
that, to the extent that science can at best show (2) and (3) to be highly 
probable, any conclusion based on them will also be only probable, and 
these probabilities can change dramatically with the accumulation of 
new data and the evolution of scientific theory. Finally, it would seem 
that the conclusions reached here in the case of the Shroud of Turin can 
easily be generalized. Science deals only with the physical world; divini-
ty is inaccessible to it. It can therefore neither confirm nor disconfirm 
claims involving the existence, nature, or agency of God. Moreover, even 
in those cases where physical evidence (or the lack thereof) seems to 
suggest divine agency or presence, this evidence, to the extent that it is 
provided by science, must be probabilistic at best. 
David Hume, in his famous chapter on miracles, says the following: 
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... we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can 
have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just founda-
tion for any such system of religion. I beg the limitations here 
made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be 
proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I 
own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or viola-
tions of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of 
proof from human testimony; ... 23 
It is not entirely clear what Hume means by this, nor are his motives for 
saying it as clear as we might hope. What is clear is that he would coun-
tenance a belief that "a violation of the usual course of nature" had 
occurred more readily if it were not used as a "foundation" for religious 
belief. In other words, we may need better reasons to base a religion on 
presumed empirical facts than we need simply to believe those facts in 
themselves. Hume may have been somewhat confused and misguided 
concerning both the nature and the possibility of miracles, but, ironically 
enough, he may have been on the right track in this instance at leasU4 
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